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Background: International documents on ethical conduct in clinical research have in common the principle that
potential harms to research participants must be proportional to anticipated benefits. The anticipated benefits that
can justify human research consist of direct benefits to the research participant, and societal benefits, also called
social value. In first-in-human research, no direct benefits are expected and the benefit component of the risks-benefit
assessment thus merely exists in social value. The concept social value is ambiguous by nature and is used in numerous
ways in the research ethics literature. Because social value justifies involving human participants, especially in early
human trials, this is problematic.
Discussion: Our analysis and interpretation of the concept social value has led to three proposals. First, as no
direct benefits are expected for the research participants in first-in-human trials, we believe it is better to discuss
a risk- value assessment instead of a risk - benefit assessment. This will also make explicit the necessity to have a
clear and common use for the concept social value. Second, to avoid confusion we propose to limit the concept
social value to the intervention tested. It is the expected improvement the intervention can bring to the wellbeing of
(future) patients or society that is referred to when we speak about social value. For the sole purpose of gaining
knowledge, we should not expose humans to potential harm; the ultimate justification of involving humans in
research lies in the anticipated social value of the intervention. Third, at the moment only the validity of the
clinical research proposal is a prerequisite for research to take place. We recommend making the anticipated social
value a prerequisite as well.
Summary: In this paper we analyze the use of the concept social value in research ethics. Despite its unavoidable
ambiguity, we aim to find a best use of the concept, subject to its role in justifying involving humans in first-in-human
research.
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International documents on ethical conduct in clinical
research have in common the principle that potential
harms to research participants must be proportional to
anticipated benefits. In first-in-human trials, participants
are not expected to gain a direct benefit as the purpose
of those trials is to examine the safety of the intervention,
and often non- therapeutic dosages are used. Although a
direct benefit cannot be excluded in phase I trials, they are
not the purpose of the study and should therefore not play
a role in the evaluation. This is especially evident when
healthy volunteers are used for these early human trials* Correspondence: m.g.j.habets@umcutrecht.nl
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unless otherwise stated.In the absence of direct benefits, risks have to be pro-
portional to the value the study has for society. The concept
social value is assumed to be sufficiently clear that it can
function in discussions on the justification of research. In-
deed, we all have an implicit notion of what is meant by so-
cial value; most people will agree that cancer research has
social value; less agreement may exist on whether research
into a human expedition to Mars will have social value.
However, social value is used in many different ways in our
everyday use, in the social sciences, and also in the aca-
demic literature on research ethics. Although the concept is
ambiguous, few critical reflections on the concept in re-
search ethics have been completed, despite the justifying
role it plays in (early human) clinical trials [1-5]. As risks
are highly unpredictable in first-in-human trials, it seemsLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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justify risks to research participants. Here, we will first aim
to clarify some of the causes of the confusion in the con-
cept ‘social value’. Despite its inherent problems, we will
next propose to limit social value to refer to the anticipated
improvement the intervention will bring, which is what we
believe would be the best use of the concept. This is im-
portant for we deem the anticipated social value of the
intervention should be a prerequisite for research to involve
human participants. Last, we will briefly discuss who should
be responsible for assessing the anticipated social value of
medical interventions. We aim to provide a foundation for
further discussion.Discussion
Plurality of social value concepts in research ethics
The concept social value is used in different ways in the
academic literature in research ethics and various ter-
minologies have been used to refer to what we call social
value, like e.g. the importance of research, the relevance
of research, humanitarian value, clinical value and health
value. Only few articles explicitly describe the social
value of research [1,2,4-7]. Here we will give a brief over-
view of some of these articles to show that even when social
value is the object of inquiry, there are still numerous ways
in which it is used.
According to the eight principles of “What makes
research ethical”, the social value of research is the ul-
timate improvement in health.
“Clinical research has instrumental value because it
generates knowledge that leads to improvement in
health. It is such improvements that ultimately
constitute the social value of research” [8].
Knowledge value and social value are thus distinguishable
according to Emanuel and colleagues, and it is the improve-
ment in health that gives research instrumental value.
In contrast, guideline 8 of CIOMS’ International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human
Subjects does not appear to discriminate between benefits
to society and generalizable knowledge [9].
Risks or interventions that do not hold out the
prospect of direct diagnostic, therapeutic or
preventive benefit for the individual must be justified
in relation to the expected benefits to society
(generalizable knowledge) [9].
For the CIOMS guidelines, the knowledge research pro-
vides, can be extrinsically valuable (it has value for the
sake of something else that is good), but also intrinsically
valuable (value a thing has in itself ). Cassarett andcolleagues also assign value to knowledge. According to
them: “A central goal of research is to produce knowledge
that is “important”, “fruitful” or that will have value” [4].
According to Kimmelman, social value can be assigned
to clinical trials, but also to the information human ex-
periments produce [5]. In addition to assigning value to
different objects, Kimmelman also distinguishes between
different kinds of value, like progressive value (the value
of a trial is seen as the likelihood it will progress to the
next phase), translational value (the value of a trial is
perceived to be wider than merely progression to the
next phase, and also includes informing preclinical testing,
other areas of research, or a change in the intervention),
and humanitarian value of clinical trials (the value clinical
research has because ‘it advances broader societal ends
like improved healthcare’) [5]. Casarett and colleagues
distinguish two categories in their proposed term
health value (the potential of a study to improve
health): immediate health value and the future health
value of a study [4]. Examples of studies that have im-
mediate health value are phase III clinical trials as they
have the potential to improve health as soon as the
drug has been proven effective and approved. Phase I
trials, in contrast, have potential future health value as
their value lies in their contribution to future research.
Karlawish makes a similar distinction when he claims
that research that will directly change clinical practice
has clinical value, which is optional for a study,
whereas scientific validity and value is necessary and
sufficient [2]. (In this paper we will use first-in-human
and phase I studies interchangeably, although we are
aware that first-in- human research consist of more
than merely phase I trials.)
We question whether they are really distinguishing be-
tween kinds of value clinical trials can have, or whether
they are pointing to different things we value in trials.
We also question whether distinguishing between differ-
ent objects that can have social value, and distinguishing
kinds of values, really makes transparent which clinical
trials are worth doing.
In addition, in the specific case of Karlawish and
Casarett, where two categories are important in balancing
a study’s risks and values, (value and clinical value; imme-
diate health value and the future health value resp.) an in-
consistency can be found. According to them, a phase III
is more likely to have clinical value than a phase I. Early
human studies, such as phase I trials, can get stuck in the
so-called Valley of Death: “the widening gap between ad-
vances in basic science and the practical application of
that knowledge” [10]. In phase III studies, safety and effi-
cacy has already been examined and they are thus more
likely to provide knowledge that may lead to clinical im-
provement. But, if the value of phase I is lower (because it
either has no clinical value or because it has no immediate
Habets et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2014, 15:66 Page 3 of 7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/66health value), as it merely contributes to future research,
why do we accept higher risks here? Indeed, a phase I trial
is performed to examine the risks; moreover, often, healthy
volunteers are enrolled, who thus will not benefit.
We believe that the assignment of ‘knowledge value’,
‘clinical value’, ‘progressive value’, or ‘future health value’
to research, knowledge, information, clinical trials and
the intervention leads to confusion as to what exactly
has social value (leaving aside the question what is social
value). We believe it is important to be clear on the
exact meaning of social value precisely because it is used
to justify involving human research participants in first-
in-human trials. Simultaneously, we are aware of the fact
that the ambiguity of the concept value will necessarily
cause confusion, as we will show below.Unravelling some of the difficulties of ‘social value’
The concept ‘value’ has been under scrutiny in many dif-
ferent research fields like sociology and philosophy,
however, little agreement exists on even the definition of
value. Consent does exist on the fact that values arise
out of human experience [11]. Whereas the term ‘benefit’
refers to an advantage or profit gained from something,
the concept value refers to the ‘regard that something is
held to deserve’ [12]. The latter is thus a relational con-
cept; both the object to be valued, and an evaluator are
necessary preconditions for value to exist. Flowers can e.g.
benefit from rain, but rain is not valuable to flowers. It is
precisely this act of appraisal that makes an analysis of
(social) value difficult.
In our everyday use, the concept of social value can
function in two main ways. First, social values can be
seen as values shared by a community of individuals;
they are values held by society and are contrasted with
individual (non-shared) values. “By social values we refer
to socially collective beliefs and systems of beliefs that
operate as guiding principles in life […]” [11]. Second,
besides values of society, the concept can also be used to
refer to values for society. Here, social value is an
assigned predicate or property of an object, [13] and in
our case, of research. This distinction reflects the conun-
drum of what is primary: values or valuing? Is a thing
valuable because it is valued, or is it valued because it is
valuable? [14] This difference can also be perceived
when we consider the questions: ‘is this intervention
valuable for society?’ and “will society value this inter-
vention?” In the latter case, we do not have to make cal-
culations, but merely need to look at the emotional
attitude ‘society’ has; in the former, we need to estimate
whether it will be valuable for society, whether it will
benefit society [15]. A first step in clarifying the concept
social value would be to distinguish these uses of the
concept; however, whether we believe something is valuableto society is dependent on the moral values we collectively
share, or the standards we have for evaluating. There is thus
a certain circularity involved, which adds to the confusion.
Unfortunately, it does not lie in the scope of our paper to
extensively analyse the concept ‘value’, nor do we think we
could solve what so far has not been solved in many differ-
ent fields. Because of the inherent confusion of the concept
value we might choose to abandon ‘social value’ from re-
search ethics altogether; however, it is questionable whether
a replacement for it will be any less confusing. Indeed, the
extra dimension that social value adds to a mere benefit or
advantage, namely the importance, appreciation, or worth,
captures exactly that which makes it a confusing concept.
Trying to discard the problems inherent to using the term
social value would entail disposing human evaluation,
which would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.The anticipated social value of medical interventions
In the remainder of this paper, we will make suggestions
on how the concept social value can function in clinical
research settings. First, we propose to speak of a risk-
value assessment in phase I trials instead of a risk- benefit
assessment, because no direct benefit to the research
participant in expected, and social value needs to be
evaluated in order to justify the trial. Although we are
aware that participants can benefit from first-in-human
trials, [16] this is irrelevant, since the evaluation and
justification of a trial needs to precede the initiation of
the trial, and phase I trials are designed for safety and
feasibility, not to provide direct benefits. Whether
phase I trials should offer a direct benefit is an import-
ant but different question that unfortunately does not
lie in the scope of our paper [17].
Second, we therefore propose that the social value (for
society) of an intervention lies in the nature and magni-
tude [6] of the improvement the intervention is expected
to have on the wellbeing of patients, individuals in society,
or society (but not research participant, for this we would
call a direct benefit!). This we will call the anticipated
social value of the intervention. (We will use the concept
“intervention” to refer to both what intervenes (the drug,
cell line, tissue, device, etc.) ánd how it intervenes, or the
application of the drug, cell line, tissue etc. “Intervention”
is derived from the Latin word intervenire, which means
“to come between”, “to step in”; the application is thus in-
tegral in our concept “intervention”). We will not ascribe
anticipated social value to clinical trials testing the inter-
vention, nor to knowledge generated by clinical trials
(although the application in the clinic resulting from
the knowledge gained, can have social value). Although
we do not deny that humans value knowledge as well as
research, for justification of exposing human participants
to risk, this valuing of is not enough. Ultimately, it is the
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have value for society. Research is a means to this end: re-
search is done in order to gain knowledge. Moreover, in
clinical trials when humans are exposed to risks, justifica-
tion needs more than the mere gain of knowledge. When
we speak about value for society, we prefer to only refer to
the improvement the intervention is likely to have on the
wellbeing of patients. Of course, our proposal will have
limitations, because ‘value’ will always be ambiguous in its
use, but limiting its use will be a clarification. A major ad-
vantage to our proposal is that a clinical trial itself cannot
justify involving humans, despite its possible perfect de-
sign, and likely progression to the clinic.
Two others questions important for the evaluation of
clinical trials are: i) will the trial likely be successful in
facilitating the introduction of the intervention to soci-
ety? In other words, will this specific research (design)
likely progress the transition of the device or interven-
tion to the clinic –whether from preclinical research or
phase III research? This we will call the translational
prospect of a clinical trial because it specifically ad-
dresses the likelihood a clinical trial will assist in the
translation of the intervention (and thus not its value).
The other question is: ii) will the trial (design) be able to
answer the research question? This has been called the
validity of research.
To reiterate; in early human clinical studies there are
three main assessments; the anticipated social value of
the intervention, the translational prospect of the clinical
trial, and the validity of a study design. For phase II and
III, direct benefits to the research participant also need
assessing. To clarify the distinctions, I will give an ex-
ample of a clinical trial with limited translational prospect
of an intervention with high anticipated social value. In
the nineties, a Phase III clinical trial took place, testing a
new antimicrobial peptide for efficacy in treating mildly
infected foot ulcers of diabetics [18]. Because of an in-
crease in antibiotic resistance worldwide, finding an effica-
cious drug alternative for antibiotics is an important
objective. Another advantage is that because the drug is
topical, it may have fewer adverse side- effects than sys-
temic antibiotics. We could thus have assigned anticipated
social value to the new intervention. The translational
prospect of this trial turned out to be low because of the
chosen comparator. The primary outcome measure was
the comparison of a reduction in clinical signs and symp-
toms of infections between the new drug and an anti-
biotic. However, the used antibiotic was not indicated for
infected foot ulcers, nor was the efficacy of using any anti-
biotic for mildly infected foot ulcers ever proven. It may
be, that a placebo control (standard wound care) would
have been as efficacious as the new antimicrobial peptide.
The comparator was thus not well chosen, and the FDA
required an additional placebo-controlled trial. Althoughthe primary outcome measure was reached, showing
equivalence did not move forward the translation of the
antimicrobial peptide (we are leaving aside here the ethical
question of using a placebo). Other reasons why a trial
may not move forward the translation of an intervention
is e.g. imperfectly chosen clinical endpoints, or (foreseen)
non-compliance in the control group. The validity of a
trial needs to be judged by an expert methodologist, and is
more straightforward than both the anticipated social
value and the translational prospect.
It will be clear from this example, that if an interven-
tion is likely to increase the wellbeing of (future) patients
it will do so regardless of the phase of the research. This
does not mean that the anticipated social value cannot
change during the translation because of new know-
ledge, or because of a change in environmental factors.
For example, the heart mate was initially meant to tem-
porarily help patients waiting for a heart transplant, but
is now also used instead of heart transplantation. Due to
an increase in knowledge on the efficacy of the heart
mate, the anticipated social value would have increased
during the trial. A change in environmental factors can
have a similar effect. For example, the anticipated social
value of the intravenous TKM 100201 infusion for the
treatment of Ebola would have been assessed differently
in 2011, than it would be now, due to the outbreak of
Ebola in Africa. It is also possible that the intervention
itself changes: Sildenafil, a drug studied for angina pec-
toris and hypertension, was found to induce penile erec-
tions during the first-in-human trials. The social value
thus changed from what it was anticipated to be, but this
is merely a result of a change in the intervention. It is
no longer an intervention against hypertension, but it
became an intervention (also) for erectile dysfunction.
Although the anticipated social value can change, in
general, large changes are not expected.
In contrast, the translational prospect of a clinical trial
does change between phase I, II and III. Undeniably, a
phase III trial is more likely to lead to the translation of
the intervention to society than a phase I; however, this
is essentially trivial. The question: will the trial be suc-
cessful in bringing the intervention closer to the bedside,
has to be evaluated within the phase of the study. The
validity of a trial needs to be assessed for each trial and
is thus by necessity different; indeed, the validity of a
phase I trial cannot be said (in general) to be lower than
the validity of a phase III trial.
Our proposal to remove ‘likelihood of translation’ out of
the value- concept, will not lead to the inconsistency of
phase I trials having lower value and higher risks. How-
ever, this does not mean that we avoid the problem of jus-
tifying these higher risks in first-in-human studies. For
there are higher risks, and in contrast to phase II and III,
the direct benefits to participants are unlikely.
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involving humans
At present, none of the major international documents
[9,19-21], including the recently revised Declaration of
Helsinki, mention social value. However, they do all refer
to for example, the importance or relevance of research.
In the Nuremberg Code, the relevance of research is a
precondition for research to be ethical [9,14]. Indeed,
paragraph 2 of the Nuremberg code reads:
“The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful
results for the good of society, unprocurable by any
other methods or means of study, and not random or
unnecessary in nature” [21].
In the Declaration of Helsinki, in contrast, the import-
ance of research is merely a component in the risks/
benefit or value analysis:
“Medical research involving human subjects may only
be conducted if the importance of the objective
outweighs the inherent risks and burdens to the
research subjects” [20].
The Declaration of Helsinki does thus not necessarily
prevent futile research from taking place. The relevance
of research is merely a component in the risk-benefit
calculation. Whether or not research is ethical therefore
depends on a balancing exercise. For the Nuremberg
Code this balancing will also take place, but in addition,
it has relevance as a minimal requirement [1]. This dif-
ference between Nuremberg and the Declaration of
Helsinki should not be mistaken for a trivial distinction.
Nor should one underestimate the amount of clinical
studies that fail to improve the wellbeing of (future) pa-
tients it is supposed to improve: indeed, more than 75%
of the 1000 new drugs approved by the FDA from
1990–2002 had a similar therapeutic quality as existing
drugs [7]. The studies into those drugs could have been
unethical according to the Nuremberg Code, however,
not according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Although validity is an accepted prerequisite for re-
search to happen, the discussion on whether the antici-
pated social value is a necessary requirement still needs
taking place. According to Freedman, the Helsinki
model is preferred, as he sees no advantage in judging
value prior to a risk-benefit analysis, especially because
the value of a study needs to be judged “within the con-
text of all other elements of the ethics of research” [1].
Only validity should be (and is at the moment!) a pre-
requisite. In Switzerland, a new law has come into force
in 2014, requiring research -involving humans- to aim
to answer “a relevant research question” [22]. Here, so-
cial value thus becomes a prerequisite of humanresearch, [23] which is coherent with the Nuremberg
code.
We believe that for any inclusion of human partici-
pants in clinical trials, the anticipated social value of the
intervention should be a precondition. An objection
could be that certain medical discoveries have been
made by coincidence, and that limiting clinical trials
thus may limit medical advancement. We disagree as ac-
cidental findings cannot be planned, nor does it mean
that we will not find any accidental findings anymore by
restricting clinical trials to interventions with anticipated
social value. Moreover, if research is unethical, it should
not be performed, regardless of whether it used to be
done, or whether it may lead to accidental scientific ad-
vances. To be clear, we are not arguing against basic re-
search; our ‘framework’ only applies to research using
human participants.
Two comments need to be made before we continue
to the next section. First, as will be clear by now, despite
the title suggests, we do not attribute social value to
clinical research, but social value is the improvement the
intervention is anticipated to bring to the wellbeing of
patients and society. And second, although we have
talked about social value within the paradigm of phasing
research, this does not mean we adhere strictly to the
phasing. However, also in different research paradigms,
anticipated social value will be attributed to the inter-
vention tested.
Research funding agencies, ethical committees and the
researcher
Yarborough suggests stating the (anticipated) social
value in informed consent forms [7]. This would allow
research participants to make an autonomous decision
on whether they think the anticipated value of the
intervention is worth entering a trial. We agree that the
anticipated social value should be made transparent,
however, just like ‘a volunteer is not free to accept any
risk whatsoever’ [24], we deem a volunteer should not
be free to accept partaking in a trial testing an interven-
tion lacking anticipated social value. It is important that
participants are aware that these trials are not con-
ducted for their benefit, but for the benefit of society,
and this should be clearly stated in the informed con-
sent form so they can make an informed decision on
whether to partake in the study.
Research Ethical Committees (REC) have the responsi-
bility to protect the research participant from harm.
They are the gatekeepers that should disapprove re-
search proposals on interventions without anticipated
social value. Although REC members have this responsi-
bility, this does not mean they alone need to identify the
anticipated social value of an intervention; this should
both be done at the level of funding (with participation
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research participant and the patient).
Whether a particular research direction has sufficient
‘value’ is at the moment decided by the research funding
agencies, steered by political decisions. Although the
public in a democracy has thus an indirect voice in the
research agenda, it can be questioned whether there is
enough transparency in the decisions made. Funding
agencies determine priority by constructing research
programs, within which calls for grant proposals are
made. At present, funding agencies do not explicitly
examine the anticipated social value of particular research
projects in view of the justification of using human partici-
pants. Indeed, at the level of funding, the question
whether the anticipated social value of an intervention is
‘large enough’ (brings a significant improvement in the
wellbeing of (future) patients)) for humans to be justifiably
exposed to possible risks is likely not explicitly addressed.
In general, it is scientists, by peer review that judge re-
search proposals, often on innovative elements, scientific
validity, and track record of the scientists. We believe that
it is important that society at large is involved in deter-
mining the anticipated social value of an intervention,
especially as there is no balancing that can be done
when anticipated social value is determined outside of a
risk-benefit analysis. There is thus no standard to decide
when an intervention has (enough) anticipated social
value. What contributes to anticipated social value? Is
severity of disease important, or number of patients
suffering from the disease, expected improvement in
quality of life, or fair innings? These are decisions that
should be taken by the public at large.
The specific research proposal (in contrast to the re-
search direction) needs to be judged by RECs by two
decisions [1]. First, they need to address the question:
does the intervention have anticipated social value?
This they will not do unaided: researches should submit
a document on the anticipated social value of an inter-
vention. This document needs to be made by careful
consideration of the information of researchers and pa-
tient representatives on the intervention. A meeting be-
tween researchers and patients moderated by someone
independent, is one of the ways this can be done [25].
An advantage of this method is that researchers are
forced to explain precisely what the anticipated social
value of the intervention would be; to which problem it
is a solution, and how it should be used. Patients can
then through e.g. the card method [26] reflect on the
effect of the intervention on their life, but also on soci-
ety [25]. The card-based communication method has
proven to aid patients join in a creative debate on the
influence a new intervention will have on their life, and
society, without having expert knowledge. Such a meeting
could be a prerequisite for REC evaluation, although weare aware that there is already resistance against the enor-
mous paperwork necessary for REC approval. However, if
we want to take patient participation seriously, it will
necessarily require additional work.
If RECs decide the intervention tested has anticipated
social value, then they will have to make a risk-benefit
assessment for phase II and III trials, or a risk-value as-
sessment for first-in-human trials. If the research ques-
tion will make a significant contribution to the progress
of the intervention into the clinic, then more risks can
be allowed than if the research question is less useful, or
the validity of the trial not as waterproof. Here, for early
human trials, the validity, translational prospect, and the
anticipated social value are all weighed against the risks
the research participant would take. But weighing only
takes place in the second decision RECs should take.
Summary
Although the concept social value is by nature ambigu-
ous, and confusion may be hard to avoid, we have pro-
posed to employ the concept ‘anticipated social value’ in
research ethics to refer to the nature and magnitude of
the improvement an intervention is expected to have on
the wellbeing of patients. Research is the instrument or
process of progressing an intervention from bench to
bedside. We believe it is important to be meticulous in
using ‘social value’, because in first-in-human studies, the
anticipated social value justifies exposing the research
participants to risks as no direct benefit for the participant
is expected, which is especially evident when healthy
volunteers are used for first-in-human trials. Therefore,
we also propose to speak of a risk-value assessment for
first-in-human trials instead of a risk-benefit assessment.
Distinguishing anticipated social value of the interven-
tion from the translational prospect and validity of re-
search may prevent the inconsistency which exists for
most authors that have attempted to make a value tax-
onomy, which is that if research itself has value (social
value, clinical value, or translational value), and phase III
research has more value than phase I, it seems hard to de-
fend why we accept more risks in phase I.
We believe that the anticipated social value should be
a prerequisite for first-in- human research to take place,
as it is already the case for the validity of research. RECs
should therefore make two evaluations for first-in-
human trials. First, they need to consider whether the
intervention tested has anticipated social value. If not,
they should reject the proposal; if the intervention does
have anticipated social value, they need to weigh the antic-
ipated social value together with the validity and transla-
tional prospect (and possible direct benefits) against the
risks the research participants will be exposed to. Whether
an intervention has anticipated social value is something
that needs to be decided by specialists, like researchers
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politics and funders.
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